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NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT

THE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF THE
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT

By OLIVER P. FIELD*

T

ineffectiveness of judicial review as an instrument for
continuous constitutional supervision over branches and
units of government in a federal system is illustrated by the experience of the nation with the legislation of the New Deal administration. Almost a year has passed since the earlier New Deal statutes were enacted. Many months have elapsed since the last of
them were approved. For half a year great industries have operated under "codes of fair competition," and nobody knows whether the statute authorizing the codes is constitutional or not. Nobody knows whether the deposit guaranty law for banks is constitutional, nor is the validity of the securities act assured. Yet
government must go on, and under a system of judicial review,
such as we have it in the United States, many more months may
elapse before we know what the answer will be to the numerous
constitutional questions to be raised in connection with these acts.,
The draftsmen of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
which is the only one of the New Deal statutes enacted by the
"Hundred Days Session" to be considered here, drew the statute
with the cases before them, and the statute gives evidence in
provision after provision that they "knew their cases" and were
trying in one section to chart their course inside of this decision,
and in the next provision were trying to get on the outside f
another decision. It is interesting to study the N. I. R. A. as a
complete statute, and as a group of detailed provisions, with the
decisions in mind, to see what the constitutional theories are that
HE

*Professor of Political Science, ,University of Minnesota.
'Judicial review, by its very nature, being confined to cases presented
to the courts by private or public litigants, and subject to the present rules
on adverse interests and parties, is a less certain method of enforcing constitutional limitations upon government than is supposed popularly to be the
case. Extreme examples of the failure of judicial review to inform interested groups of the answer to be given to constitutional questions are to be
found in such cases as that of the act of 1834, reducing the gold content of
the dollar, said in dictum to be valid in Hepburn v. Griswold, (1870) 8
Wall. (U.S.) 603, 19 L. Ed. 513, and the Tenure.of Office Act of President
Johnson's administration, held invalid in Myers v. United States, (1926)

272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21, 71 L. Ed. 160.
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underlie it. It is the purpose of this article to examine into some
of the more significant constitutional questions presented by the
National Industrial Recovery Act and, in testing the statutory
provisions by the theory and decision of past cases, to surmise, if
possible, what the general formulations of rules and principles
would sound and look like, if the Act were to be held constitutional.
I
Section one of "an act to encourage national industrial recovery, to foster fair competition, and to provide for the construction of certain useful public works, and for other purposes" announces the constitutional theory of its draftsmen when it recites
that "a national emergency productive of widespread unemployment and disorganization of industry which burdens interstate
and foreign commerce, affects the public welfare, and undermines
the standards of living of the American people, is hereby declared
to exist."
The following sentence makes this theory more explicit, by
saying that
"it is hereby declared to be the policy of congress to remove
obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce
which tend to diminish the amount thereof; and to provide for
the general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for
the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups, to induce
and maintain united action of labor and management under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair
competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible utilization of
the present productive capacity of industries, to avoid undue
restrictions of production (except as may be temporarily required), to increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and
relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources."
This statute is not based upon the theory that it is a regulation
of only interstate and foreign commerce. It regulates commerce
which relates to or bears upon interstate and foreign commerce,
on the theory that the power of congress over interstate and foreign commerce extends to the regulation of conditions and factors,
activities and individuals, which affect these two types of commerce, just as fully as that power extends to the regulation of
interstate and foreign commercial transactions themselves. It is
perfectly clear that many of the commercial activities covered by
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this statute are of an interstate character, and it is equally clear
that many of them are not of that character at all, but that the
conditions prevailing in these intrastate businesses are such as to
affect interstate commerce adversely.
The declaration of an emergency is of importance in this connection only as showing that the conditions obtaining in intrastate
business are affecting interstate business to an unusual degree, to
such a degree that the whole, or a major part, of commercial activity must be subjected to national regulation in order to save interstate commerce. The National Industrial Recovery Act is not to
be regarded as an attempt to vest congress with some new power
by the declaration of an emergency, as such, for the statute is
based upon the commerce power, and not upon an emergency
power.
The references to public welfare, the standards of fair competition, and the position of labor, are all to be read in the light of
the principles formulated in the preceding paragraphs, and are to
be read with the limitations implicit in them. Congress is not
pretending here to legislate for the general welfare as such, for it
is well known that existing constitutional doctrines do not permit
congress to exercise any such governmental power in general. But
congress has attempted to legislate for the general welfare, the
welfare of industry, and the welfare of labor and agriculture, in
order to remove the burden on interstate and foreign commerce
which it declares is resting upon those types of commerce to such
an extent that they must be protected against the effects of this
burden. The codes, licenses, and "blue eagle" agreements are
methods for accomplishing the removal of this burden.
That this is the theory underlying the National Industrial Recovery Act is the unmistakable import of such a provision as that
contained in subsection (b) of section three of -the statute, wherein
codes establishing standards of fair competition are authorized.
"Any violation of such standards in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce shall be deemed an unfair method of competition in commerce within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended; but nothing in this title shall be construed to impair the powers of the Federal Trade Commission
under such Act, as amended."
It would be difficult to formulate a more clear statement that the
codes are to be extended to businesses which normally would be
considered intrastate, and thus outside the sphere of congressional
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control, than is contained in the sentence just quoted from the
statute, reading as it does, "in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce." Subsection (f) of section three uses the same phraseology, in prescribing penalties for the violation of any code promulgated in accordance with the statute. Identical phrasing also
is to be found in subsection (a) of section four, which authorizes
the president to enter into voluntary agreements "if in his judgment such agreements will aid in effectuating the policy of this
title with respect to transactions in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce ....
"
From the standpoint of the constitutional power of congress
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the National Industrial Recovery Act may be considered under the following divisions. There is, first, the portion of the statute which regulates
interstate and foreign commerce by the use of ordinary penal
sanctions, such as fine and imprisonment for the violation of the
rules formulated by the statute itself, or for the violation of rules
made by some other agency authorized by the statute to make
them. The codes are to be considered under this heading.
There is, in the second place, the licensing provision of section
four (b), which as yet has not been put into effect by the executive, but which, nevertheless, is authorized by the statute, although
it is limited in its operation to only one year, while the Act generally is to operate for a period of two years, subject of course to
termination of the emergency at an earlier date by resolution of
congress, or by executive proclamation. This section involves
the prohibition of commerce as a phase of licensing.
There is, in the third place, the provision in section nine (c),
relating to the regulation of oil, wherein the executive is authorized by congress to exclude articles from interstate and foreign
commerce, if withdrawal or shipment of the oil is illegal under
state law.2
II
Some of the cases that must have been in the minds of the
draftsmen of the Act when they enunciated the doctrine that congress could regulate not only interstate and foreign commerce but
also its instrumentalities, the sources of supply, and persons, and
2
See generally, on the problems of this paper, Note (1933) 47 Harv.
L. Rev. 85. The Securities Act is given elaborate discussion in (1933) 43

Yale L. J. 171-316.
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activities related to such commerce, in addition to intrastate commerce which adversely affects interstate and foreign commerce,
should be mentioned at this point.
The railroad rate cases furnish the best illustrations of this
principle." It is now well settled that congress may regulate intrastate rates if such rates discriminate against interstate commerce.
In no sense is this based upon any argument that the business
regulated is interstate, for it is admittedly intrastate, but it is
placed squarely upon the theory that its regulation is necessary to
protect interstate commerce.
The safety appliance law is applicable to intrastate transportation by railroad as well as to interstate transportation, because of
the close connection between the two. The safety of interstate
traffic is affected by the conditions of safety appliances used in
intrastate carriage.'
To forge a bill of lading is a crime against the national government, even though the forger sent no goods in interstate commerce, and contemplated sending none. The protection of these
instruments, which are so convenient in commercial transactions,
is so important for interstate commerce that congress may protect them by the imposition of criminal penalties for their fraudulent issuance.'
The Packers and Stockyards Act, regulating the charges of
commission merchants in the stockyards, has been upheld, not because these men are engaged in interstate commerce, but because
the protection of the buyer and seller in such transactions as are
connected with this business is important for interstate commerce.'
The elevator which stores wheat is not engaged in interstate
commerce, but nevertheless the Federal Grain Standards Act may
be applied to it. 7

The relation between wheat in an elevator to

3

Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., (1922)
257 U. S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232, 66 L. Ed. 371.
4Southern Ry. v. United States, (1911) 222 U. S. 20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2,
56 L. Ed. 72; Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, (1916) 241 U. S. 33, 36 Sup.
Ct. 482, 60 L. Ed. 874.
%UnitedStates v. Ferger, (1919) 250 U. S. 199, 39 Sup. Ct. 445, 63

L. Ed. 936.
6
Stafford v. Wallace, (1922) 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397, 66 L. Ed.
735; Tagg Bros. & Moorehead v. United States, (1930) 280 U. S. 420, 50
Sup. Ct. 220, 74 L. Ed. 524.
7
Merchants Exchange v. Missouri, (1919) 248 U. S. 365, 39 Sup. Ct.
114, 63 L. Ed. 300. Such an act is to protect the buyer and seller, presumably.
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interstate commerce, into which it passes in the normal course of
business, is sufficiently close to justify such legislation.
The Grain Futures Trading Act, which was first held invalid
in Hill v. Wallace," was amended to include the sales called intrastate by the Supreme Court in that case, and when so amended
was upheld in Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen.9 Professor
Gavit correctly observes that
"the real distinction between the cases is that in the first case
the court overlooked the fact that so-called intrastate sales could
be regulated, if they were reasonably necessary for the protection
of interstate sales and transportation.10
The Sherman anti-trust law provided for the punishment of
persons combining to restrain commerce between the states, and it
is not necessary that the persons combining be engaged in interstate commerce to come within the prohibition of that law.' A
quotation from Bedford Cut Stone Company v. Journeymen Stone
Cutters Association of North Amerca 2 shows the trend of the
more recent cases on this point. The Supreme Court said in
that case:
"But when the intent of those unlawfully preventing the
manufacture or production is shown to be to restrain or control
the supply entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the
price of it in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of
the anti-trust act."
It was held in the Bedford Case that the statutes could be applied
to laboring groups who by concerted action prevented goods from
entering into interstate commerce from the major source of supply
of those goods. Much emphasis was laid by the Supreme Court
in this, and in the Coronado Case,'8 on the natural effect of the
acts complained of being such as to affect and restrict the normal
flow of interstate commerce from the source of supply. It seems
pretty certain now that intent is not the major factor in these deci8(1922) 259 U. S. 44, 42 Sup. Ct. 453, 66 L. Ed. 822.
9(1923) 262 U. S.1, 43 Sup. Ct. 470, 67 L. Ed. 839.
' 0 Gavit, The Commerce Clause, 245.

"Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, (1908) 209 U. S. 423, 28 Sup.
Ct. 572, 52 L. Ed. 865; United States v. Am.Tobacco Co., (1911) 221 U. S.

106, 31 Sup. Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663; Swift & Company v. United States,
(1905) 196 U. S.375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518; United States v.
Brims, (1926) 272 U. S.549, 47 Sup. Ct 169, 71 L.Ed. 403; United States
v.First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., (1930) 282 U. S.44, 51 Sup. Ct. 45, 75 L. Ed.

151.

12(1927)
8
"

274 U. S.37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 916.

Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, (1925)

45 Sup. Ct. 551, 69 L. Ed. 963.

268 U. S.295,
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sions, but that the closeness of the connection between the action
taken and interstate commerce, and the social significance or commercial significance of the result, really constitute the basis for
them.1
Turning to the Recovery Act, it can be said that in a certain
sense nobody intended by his actions to bring on the depression
which began in 1929. But is it necessary that anyone should intend it to bring into play the power of congress to remove the
burdens resulting from the depression so far as interstate commerce is concerned? Under the analysis just presented, no such
intent would be necessary. If the natural and normal result of
the factors operating upon interstate commerce in a period of depression is to restrict that commerce, or adversely affect the supply of that commerce, or the amount of it, or if intrastate commerce is so carried on as to unfairly compete with interstate commerce, then congress may legislate to correct these conditions, providing the burdens upon interstate commerce are as congress declares them to be, and providing that the measures of correction be
appropriate.
A question of fact thus presents itself: does the depression
create an economic condition in which interstate commerce is unduly burdened by the situation existing in intrastate commerce?
A classical economist would deny that an economic emergency
exists, no doubt, because depressions are as normal, that is, as
usual, as are periods of prosperity. In 1930 a great many people
felt that no real emergency existed, but now, in 1933, the great
majority of the population of the United States believe that a real
economic emergency exists. Also, the inevitable result of this
emergency must be to diminish the amount of goods flowing into
interstate commerce. The economic pressure of the depression
may well cause unfair practices to be used much more than in a
time of prosperity.
At this point two cases suggest themselves. The first holds
that manufacturing is not commerce. This is the E. C. Knight
14"The words 'intent' and 'necessary effect' are used almost synonymously by the courts in this connection." Comment, (1933) 32 Mich. L.
Rev. 240, p. 248, n. 35.

See United Leather Workers Int'l Union v.

Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., (1924) 265 U. S. 457, 44 Sup. Ct. 623, 68 L.
Ed. 1104; Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, (D.C.
Pa. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 559. The subject of "Strike As Interference With
Interstate Commerce" is dealt with in an excellent comment under that
title in (1933) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 240.
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Case. 1 5 It should be observed that no claim was made in that case
that the business so affected interstate commerce as to come within the rule that congressional power over commerce extends to
intrastate as well as interstate commerce if the former requires
regulation to save the latter from discrimination or burden.
Manufacturing is still intrastate commerce, just as it was when
the Knight Case was decided. The National Industrial Recovery
Act does not seek to regulate manufacturing on the ground that
it is interstate commerce. It seeks to regulate intrastate commerce, that is, manufacturing for example, because it is affecting
interstate commerce in a substantial and real manner.
The second of the two cases is the child labor case, Hammer
v. Dagenhart,"'wherein congress sought to exclude goods from
interstate commerce because they were manufactured in factories
employing child labor. The difference which immediately suggests itself, between this case and the Recovery Act, is that child
labor was not creating any great nation-wide burden on interstate
commerce, while the present economic emergency is creating such
a burden. From this point of view the Recovery Act might well
be held constitutional, without molesting the child labor case, so
far as congressional regulation is concerned, assuming that the
method of regulation be permissible. The power to regulate was
absent in the child labor case, while the draftsmen of the Recovery Act would insist that the present conditions bring into play
a different constitutional theory which permits congress to exercise the power to regulate the businesses affected by the Act, because of the close relation between the depression and interstate
commerce. The question of the permissibility of the exclusionary technique employed in the child labor case will be discussed
later. It is with the question of the power to regulate the businesses involved that we are now concerned.
At this point it may be well to differentiate between two standards that are applied to the reasonableness of congressional regulations of interstate commerce and such intrastate commerce as
comes closely in contact with interstate commerce. In the first
place, the reasonableness of the regulation is to be tested by its
appropriateness to accomplish the end desired, in the sense of the
necessary and proper clause. That is to say, in accordance with a
15(1895) 156 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325.
16(1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 110.
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century old canon of interpretation of the constitutional powers
of congress, that body has the powers enumerated in the constitution and in addition such powers as can be implied from the
powers thus expressly enumerated. The process of implying a
power from an express power or group of express powers is the
process of combining the express power and the necessary and
proper clause. In this sense it is always the practice of the Supreme
Court to inquire, when the issue is presented properly, into the
question whether the regulation of commerce in any particular
instance is "necessary and proper" as this phrase has been applied.
This is a standard implicit in all grants of power to congress and
is not peculiar to the power over commerce.
In the second place, there are those other standards of reasonableness which are established by other provisions of the constitution, such as due process of law. This is not a standard
applied in connection with a grant of power, as the first one is,
but is a standard arising from an express limitation upon congressional power. Granted that the power of congress over the
subject is established, and granted that the control exercised is
reasonable in the sense that it is within the scope of the express
power itself and the necessary and proper clause, there always
remains the question whether the control and the methods of control meet the requirements of such an express limitation upon governmental power as that contained in the due process clause. Professor Gavit properly emphasizes this point in his recent work on
The Commerce Clause.' 7 The commerce clause itself contains no
such requirement of reasonableness as that imposed upon congress
by the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The regulation involved in the blanket agreement is voluntary,
although voluntary in about the same sense that election is voluntary under workmen's compensation laws.' 8 Nevertheless, from
a constitutional point of view, the fact remains that economic and
social pressure is insufficient to render the "blue eagle" agreements
compulsory.
The codes, likewise, in the typical instances, are voluntary, for
although the privileges of codes are denied to non-code industries,
17See Gavit, The Commerce Clause 171-78; Corwin, Congress's Power
to Prohibit Commerce, (1933) 18 Corn L. Q. 477.

'sBooth Fisheries Company v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin,

(1926) 271 U. S. 208, 46 Sup. Ct. 491, 70 L. Ed. 908, upholding a so-called

"elective" act.
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such as the limited immunity from prosecution for violation of
the anti-trust laws, it is permissible for them to remain under
those laws if they wish to do so. The more serious difficulty here
is that the president is authorized to prescribe a code for an industry if the industry itself does not submit one. But here the executive can only impose the code after notice and hearing, and the
code must establish rules designed to insure fair competition. In
authorizing this to be done congress is doing no more than it did
in the anti-trust laws and in the Trade Commission Act, for those
acts also established standards of competition. The Recovery Act
goes a step further and provides for a code of fair competition.
From the standpoint of the commerce clause, the codes, then,
are not any great deviation from legislative precedent. Classical
economics doubtless would contend that the standards of the Sherman Act really tended to maintain competition, while those of the
codes are aimed at the restriction of competition, but competition
as a principle is not required by the constitution, and the legally
significant thing here is that in both cases congress imposed upon
industry a set of rules dealing with fair competition. If the power
to establish standards of this kind be established, as it is under
the Sherman Act, then the question of the reasonableness of those
standards is to be settled under the due process clause.' 9 This all
assumes, of course, that both interstate and intrastate business can
be subjected to this type of control under the principles enunciated
in section one of the Recovery Act. It should be emphasized
again that this regulation is authorized only for the period of the
present burden on interstate commerce, or, at most, under the
present Act, for two years.
The methods of enforcement utilized in the Recovery Act at
this point present no new problems, for fines and imprisonment
alone are prescribed, with some provision for equitable relief also,
20
but these are all established in previous anti-trust legislation.
These are the general regulatory phases of the Recovery Act.
No particularly difficult problems either of commerce or due process are presented by this phase of the N. I. R. A. The fact that
economists may feel that these measures retard recovery does not
justify the Supreme Court in limiting congress to that particular
view. If congress wishes to adopt institutionalist economic theor29See cases cited supra, note 10.
2015 ,U. S. C. A. secs. 1, 11, 15, 26, 2 Mason's U. S. Code tit. 15, secs. 1,
11, 15, 26 deal with enforcement of Sherman Act.
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ies in recovery legislation, it should be free to do so despite a past
record on the part of institutionalists of severe criticism of the
Supreme Court. The fact of the matter is that the Supreme Court
has adopted institutionalist doctrines more than once before this.
III
More difficult questions are raised when the exclusionary features of the Act are considered. Does the power of congress over
interstate and foreign commerce include within "regulation" the
power to exclude articles from commerce, that is, to prohibit commerce ?
At the outset of a discussion of congressional power to close
the doors of interstate commerce to certain articles or persons, an
important distinction between two types of exclusion should be
kept in mind. On the one hand goods may be excluded from commerce because something in connection with them is declared to
be illegal by congress. Something about the goods or the conditions or persons connected with them is penalized by congress by
barring the goods from interstate channels. This should be distinguished from exclusion which, on the other hand, is the result
of congressional recognition of an illegality impressed upon the
goods by state law. The second of these problems of exclusion
will be considered in connection with section nine (c) of the Recovery Act, dealing with oil. The problem at this point is not
whether congress may aid state policy in this manner, but whether
congress by its own power can impress upon the goods a sufficient
quality in law to bar them from interstate trade.
This inevitably leads to an inquiry into the power of congress
over the conditions surrounding the production and marketing of
goods, through the medium of closing the doors of interstate commerce to the goods.
The licensing provisions found in section four (b) of the Act
use the exclusionary method of enforcement of the policy of the
Act. This portion of the Act has not been put into operation as
yet, but it must be considered because it is the most severe control
provided for in the Act, and for that reason raises the question of
congressional power in an acute form. A reproduction in toto of
section four (b) will make the re-statement of it which follows
the easier to check by reference to the text itself.
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"(b) Whenever the president shall find that destructive wage
or price cutting or other activities contrary to the policy of this
title are being practiced in any trade or industry or any subdivision
thereof, and, after such public notice and hearing as he shall specify, shall find it essential to license business enterprises in order to
make effective a code of fair competition or an agreement under
this title or otherwise to effectuate the policy of this title, and shall
publicly so announce, no person shall, after a date fixed in such
announcement, engage in or carry on any business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, specified in such announcement, unless he shall have first obtained a license issued pursuant
to such regulations as the president shall prescribe. The president may suspend or revoke any such license, after due notice and
opportunity for hearing, for violations of the terms or conditions
thereof. Any order of the president suspending or revoking any
such license shall be final if in accordance with law. Any person
who, without such a license, or in violation of any condition thereof, carries on any such business for which a license is so required,
shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $500, or
imprisoned not more than six months, or both, and each day such
violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 2 (c), this subsection shall
cease to be in effect at the expiration of one year after the date of
enactment of this Act or sooner if the president shall by proclamation or the congress shall by joint resolution declare that the
emergency recognized by section 1 has ended."
The meaning and significance of subsection (b) of section
four is somewhat clarified if it is restated in the following manner, although such a restatement should not be taken to cast any
reflection upon the phraseology employed in the Act itself.
Section four (b) provides that:
I. The president may require licenses of "any business" specified in such announcement "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce."
A. If he finds that in any trade or industry,
1. Destructive wage cutting,
2. Destructive price cutting,
3. Or other activities contrary to the policy of this title
are being practiced.
B. And gives public notice and hearing.
C. And finds it "essential to license business enterprises in
order to make effective a code of fair competition or an
agreement under this title."
D. "And shall publicly so announce."
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II. "No person shall, after a date fixed in such announcement,
engage in or carry on any business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . unless he shall have first
obtained a license issued pursuant to such regulations as the
president shall prescribe."
A fine or imprisonment or both is prescribed for the violation
of (1) the terms of the license, or (2) the requirement of a license for the conduct of a business, that is, for carrying on a
business without a license when a license is required.
The significance of this subsection lies in the fact that the
president is authorized to require a license of "any business". "in
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" if he finds it "essential" "in order to make effective a code of fair competition or an
agreement under this title." This must refer to the codes of fair
competition and the "blue eagle" agreements authorized by the
Act because of the emergency threatening interstate and foreign
commerce.
If it can be assumed that congress is acting within its power
when it subjects interstate and intrastate business to codes of fair
competition, either voluntarily adopted or imposed by executive
order after hearings, on the theory advanced in the preceding
section of this discussion, then the question next to be answered
is whether licensing is a proper method of enforcing such codes
and agreements.
Licensing is a strict and a more severe method of control than
the method discussed in the preceding section, because it substitutes administrative supervision, which is continuous, or can be
continuous, for the sporadic and case-to-case method of control
under a system of legislatively formulated rules enforced by criminal prosecution. Revocation of a license has the effect of making
illegal that which is made legal by the possession of a li'ense. This
is of the essence of a licensing system, and is the nature of a
license, namely, that a license makes legal conduct which without
a license is illegal. A licensing statute has that effect. Barring
the goods from interstate commerce is the method of enforcing
the licensing policy, it being legal to carry on interstate or related
intrastate business with the license, and illegal to carry it on without one.
The control through licensing here is the more severe because
of the power of revocation vested in an administrative authority,
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which is customary in the case of license in the law generally, and
making the administrative revocation "final" if in accordance with
law.
Is licensing a proper method of regulating commerce? Does
the power to regulate include the power to exclude or prohibit?
Licensing inevitably raises this question of prohibition, for without an express statutory declaration to that effect it is implied in
a licensing system that the conduct licensed is illegal without the
license.
There can be but little question concerning the validity of
licensing as a method of controlling the facilities of interstate and
foreign commerce. Licenses and permits have for years been required by congressional act, as applied to railroads, ships, and
other instruments of commerce. It would seem also that licensing
is valid as a method of regulation, including, as it does, prohibition, if congress has power to control the field, which here is interstate and intrastate business. If the premise of the Act is sound,
that intrastate business may now be regulated during the depression because of its effect upon interstate business, then licensing
would seem to be a valid method of regulation. Licensing is an
2
old and established method of regulation in the law generally, '
and has been used in the field of interstate and foreign commerce. 22
If licensing is a valid method of regulation in the field of
interstate and foreign commerce, it should likewise be valid if
applied to intrastate business, if such intrastate business adversely
affects interstate and foreign commerce. It is appropriate as a
method of regulation, because of the advantages of administrative
21

Licensing is not restricted to businesses affected with a public health
or moral aspect, such as liquor, pool halls, milk, or the healing professions,
but is validly applied to perfectly legitimate businesses having no such
aspect, and is often used as a method of enforcing standards upon a business which is subject to regulation under the police power of government.
The fact of licensing, in and of itself, raises no difficulties, but attempts to
use licensing as a method of creating monopolies do raise serious constitutional questions, aside from the reasonableness of notice and hearing, in the
revocation and granting of licenses.
22
See The Daniel Ball, (1871) 10 Wall. (U.S.) 557, 19 L. Ed. 999.
Licenses are granted to railroads in the more modern form of certificates
of convenience and necessity, as under .the Transportation Act of 1920.
Trade-marks to businesses in interstate commerce may be validly registered,
regulated, and protected by national law, and constitute a permit type of
licensing. Examples of current licensing statutes in. the national government, are: 21 U. S. C. A. secs. 154, 155, 2 Mason's U. S. Code tit. 21, secs.
154, 155; 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 252, 1 Mason's U. S. Code tit. 7, sec. 252.
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over judicial supervision and enforcement in many fields of the
law, particularly in the commercial field.
Assuming that licensing is included within the power to regulate, and assuming that licensing includes prohibition, does this
portion of the Recovery Act run counter to the child labor case?
That case is to be regarded, not as deciding against the power of
congress to exclude materials from interstate commerce, if the
conditions or persons regulated are within the permissible field of
regulation, but as deciding that the manufacturing involved in that
case, under the conditions then prevailing in industry throughout
the country, did not come within the congressional power over
interstate commerce. 23 This must be the meaning of that decision
unless earlier and later cases are to be termed exceptions to the
rule of the child labor case.
The Lottery Cases,24 wherein lottery tickets were denied entrance into interstate commerce, upheld the legislation. The interstate transportation of persons for immoral purposes has been forbidden by congressional statute, and the statute has been upheld. 25
Congress has made it a crime to transport stolen automobiles
in interstate commerce, and has also visited this punishment upon
those who receive the goods knowing of their stolen character, and
this statute has also been sustained. 2' Goods subjected to quarantine have been barred from interstate commerce.2 Likewise, goods
coming under the Pure Food and Drug Act are prohibited from
interstate channels unless they are labelled as required by law. 28
2

3See comments on the child labor case in Brooks v. United States,

(1925) 267 U. S. 432, 45 Sup. Ct. 345, 69 L. Ed. 699.

24(1903) 188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321, 47 L. Ed. 492. See on the whole
problem of using national power over commerce to accomplish ends nor-

mally reached by the use of police power whenever that power is reserved

to the particular governmental unit, Cushman, National Police Power Under
the Commerce Clause, (1919) 3 MINNESOTA LAw REv Iw 289, 381, 452.
The statute excluding prize-fight films from interstate and foreign commerce was upheld as to foreign commerce in Weber v. Freed, (1915) 239
U. S. 325, 36 Sup. Ct. 131, 60 L. Ed. 308, and that excluding opium, in
Brolan
v. United States (1915) 236 U. S. 216, 35 Sup. Ct. 285, 59 L. Ed. 544.
25
Caminette v. United States, (1917) 242 U. S. 470, 37 Sup. Ct. 192,

61 L.2 Ed. 442.
6Brooks v. United States, (1925) 267 U. S. 432, 45 Sup. Ct. 345, 69
L. Ed. 699.
2739 Stat. at L. 1165. See Oregon-W. R. & Nay. Co. v. Washington,
(1926) 270 U. S. 87, 46 Sup. Ct. 279, 70 L. Ed. 482 (alfalfa) ; Thornton v.
United States, (1926) 271 U. S. 414, 46 Sup. Ct. 585, 70 L. Ed. 1013, (cattle) ; Mo. K. & R. R. v. Haber, (1898) 169 U. S. 613, 18 Sup. Ct. 488, 42
L. Ed.
28 878 (quarantine discussion).
Hippolite Egg Company v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, 31 Sup. Ct.
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The Hepburn Act of 1906 contains a clause, known as the commodities clause, which forbids interstate carriers to transport
29
commodities in which they have an interest.

This power to prohibit goods and persons to enter interstate
commerce has been exercised by congress in numerous instances,
and in several of them has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
The child labor case is the only decision invalidating such an act
of congress, and there, as noted elsewhere, the Supreme Court
held that manufacturing was not commerce, and so could not be
regulated. It was not the fact of prohibition,but the fact of regulation, which was the weakness of the child labor statute.
So we are back again to the original question lying back of all
phases of the Recovery Act, namely, the question whether manufacture now in the depression of 1929 is so closely connected with
interstate commerce as to come within the power over interstate
commerce. No mistake should be made in assuming that the
Supreme Court must hold that manufacture is commerce to uphold the Recovery Act under the commerce power. What is required to uphold it is that the Supreme Court give its judicial
approval to the declaration in section one that a burden is now
resting upon interstate and foreign commerce because of existing
conditions in the sources of supply for interstate commerce, the
sources being manufacturing, among others.
John Marshall thought that the power to regulate included
the power to prohibit commerce, and while some statements in later
cases have cast some doubt upon this, the actual decisions seem
clearly to establish the authority of Marshall's view in the modern
law. 30 After all, prohibition is sometimes about the only method
available which is effective, so far as governmental procedures are
concerned. It is practically impossible to license or supervise some
kinds of practices. The only thing which can be done with them is
to prohibit them. If congress feels that prohibition is the only
effective manner in which to deal with a subject, then prohibition
should be permissible, if it be appropriate, convenient, and within
364, 55 L. Ed. 364. Certain types of tea excluded, upheld in Buttfield v.
Stranahan, (1903) 192 U. S. 470, 24 Supr. Ct. 349, 48 L. Ed. 524.
29

Delaware, L. & W. Ry. v. United States, (1913) 231 U. S. 363, 34
Sup. Ct. 65, 58 L. Ed. 269.
3
°For an excellent analysis of the history of this view, as expressed by
Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat, (U.S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23, see
Corwin Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce, (1933) 18 Corn. L. Q.
477.
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the rule of the "necessary and proper" clause referred to earlier,
and if the subject itself be within the sphere of congressional regulation.
From the standpoint of the second standard of reasonableness,
namely, that established by the due process clause, prohibition and
licensing are both established methods of control. The use of
licenses has been widespread, and the use of prohibition has had
some vogue, and both have met with favor at the hands of the
courts. Licensing, if it be reasonable, is permitted by due process
of law.
Reasonableness, in licensing, under due process, consists of
several things. Notice and hearing are important, if important
property rights are involved. Notice and hearing are carefully
provided for in the Recovery Act at almost every stage. Likewise, some recourse to courts of law upon questions of revocation
may be insisted upon, and the Recovery Act provides expressly
that the president's revocation shall be final if in accordance with
law. This implies, of course, that recourse to court is permissible when revocation is not in accordance with law.
Some have thought that the recent decision in the Oklahoma
Ice Case has thrown some doubt upon the use of licensing as a
method of control, but that case is quite different from those likely
to be raised under the Recovery Act, for that case involved an
attempt to create a monopoly by the use of licensing."' There is
nothing in the Recovery Act to show that such is the intention of
that statute. Licensing here is to be a form of control, not a form
of monopoly. Even that extreme form of control is sometimes
permitted under the licensing powerA2 But although the ordinary
business could not be subjected to licensing for the purpose of
monopoly, few businesses are constitutionally exempt from regulation through licensing, when used as a method of control. 83 The
licensing provision in the Recovery Act, however, pretty clearly
is restricted in its scope and purpose, being limited to the effective
enforcement of the codes of fair competition. This clearly limits
the use of licensing to a legitimate purpose and field. The words
of the statute make it clear that licensing is to be resorted to only
3'New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, (1932) 285 U. S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371,

76 L. Ed. 747.

32This is sometimes true in liquor licensing, for example.
Many states exact licenses from seventy-five to one hundred different

33

activities and businesses and professions, exclusive of those licensed by cities.
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when certain phases of the recovery program require licensing to
make that program effective. That program is one of control,
subject to the exceptions concerning limited production mentioned
in the statute, and these exceptions are expressly put on a temporary basis.
Itis evident that the framers of the recovery legislation had
some precedents upon which to rely, and although in each instance
this recovery legislation goes slightly further than the precedents,
they establish a trend in which the Recovery Act is only a logical
next step, so far as congressional control over commerce is concerned.
IV
Section nine (c), relating to oil, raises a somewhat different
question. It is the second of the exclusionary questions mentioned
earlier. In it congress has sought to close the doors to interstate
commerce for goods declared by state law to be improper subjects
of commerce for one reason or another. Section nine (c) reads as
follows:
"The president is authorized to prohibit the transportation in
interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products
thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the
amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by
any state law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by
any board, commission, officer or other duly authorized agency of a
state. Any violation of any order of the president issued under
the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not
to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months,
or both."
An executive order issued by the president on July 11, 1933,
recited that in interstate and foreign commerce the transportation
of petroleum and the products thereof "produced or withdrawn
from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or
withdrawn from storage by any state law .. .is hereby prohibited."
The question raised by this section of the statute and the executive order issued by authority therein granted is whether congress may lend its aid in this way to the states in enforcing state
laws governing the production and storage of oil in a state, and the
withdrawal of oil from the state. The manner in which the
national executive is hereby authorized to aid the state in enforcing its policy is that of closing the channels of interstate and for-
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eign commerce to the products sought to be regulated by the state.
It is to be noted that the channels of interstate commerce here are
closed at the source of supply, or, to state it in another way, at the
point of the beginning of the interstate journey or transaction. It
should be noted also that only that oil is excluded from interstate
commerce which valid state laws make it illegal to produce or withdraw. This subsection does not make a state regulation valid, if
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for
example, it is invalid.
The theory of this subsection is that if the interstate commerce clause limits the state in its constitutional power to forbid
the withdrawal of the oil from the state after it has been extracted
from the well, then this limitation shall no longer be effective, because congress hereby subjects the oil thus produced and stored
to state law, divesting it, as it were, of any character as an article
of interstate commerce which it may have acquired.$' The words
of the statute do not divest it of such a character in express terms,
but do say that it shall not be an article in interstate commerce, so
far as national law is concerned. Read in this light, the statute
might be said to be an attempt to apply the doctrine of the liquor
cases to oil at the beginning of the journey, and to avoid the result
of some decisions which have limited the power of the states to
restrict the sale or transportation in interstate commerce of natural resources produced or extracted in the state until the needs
of the home market had been satisfied. 5 Section nine (c) seems
designed to remove this restriction upon the state so far as oil
is concerned.
This seems to be a reasonable interpretation to place upon the
subsection, and under this view the exclusion of the oil from the
channels of interstate and foreign commerce would only be applying a congressional policy of permitting state laws to apply.
This is not the only time that congress has enacted legislation
barring from interstate commerce goods illegally produced or sold
or acquired contrary to state law. The transportation of game
3

'See, on this problem, Gavit, The Commerce Clause sec. 111. Also Dow-

ling and Hubbard, Divesting An Article of Its Interstate Character, (1921)
5 MiNNESCorA LAW REVmw 100; 253.
35Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, (1923) 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct.
658, 67 L. Ed. 1117; Foster-Fountain Packing Company v. Haydel, (1928)
(1938) 278 U. S. 1, 49 Sup. Ct. 1, 73 L. Ed. 147. See, on the power of a
state to conserve something by way of taxation, Hope Natural Gas Company v. Hall, (1927) 274 U. S. 284, 47 Sup. Ct. 639, 71 L. Ed. 1049.
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slaughtered in violation of state law,8 and the Webb-Kenyon
Act,8 7 prohibiting the shipment of liquor into a state in which the
transportation of liquor was forbidden by state law, and the Reed
Bone-Dry Amendment of 1918, prohibiting the transportation of
liquor into a state in which the manufacture of liquor was forbidden, 88 are examples of earlier statutes of this type. These statutes have been upheld whenever tested in the Supreme Court.88
It should be remembered that the child labor case did not
apply to this kind of a situation, for there the goods were forbidden to enter interstate commerce because of a character sought to
be impressed upon them by national law, not because of a character impressed upon them by state law. The child labor case,
then, is distinguishable from the cases bearing upon this phase of
the Recovery Act.
Oil is a natural resource of a state just as game is, according
to the theory of the Recovery Act, and although the Supreme
Court has never had occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of
the game statute no serious doubt concerning its validity seems to
have been entertained.
Throughout the foregoing paragraphs of the discussion of
section nine (c) it is assumed, of course, that the state has the
power to make the acts illegal or the goods illegal, and no intimation should be drawn from these observations that congress could
have closed the door of interstate commerce to these articles in the
absence of a valid state exercise of power to impress upon the
goods or upon the persons or acts related to them a character of
illegality. In some cases, as noted earlier, congress has been able
to do this. There seems to be no valid reason why congress may
not apply the doctrine of the Clark Distilling Company Case"' to
the state of origin as well as to the state of destination. The relations to interstate commerce are the same. In both instances congress is seeking to relieve the goods of an interstate character
8831 Stat. at L. 188, 35 Stat. at L. 1137. Ruppert v. United States, (C.
C.A. 8th Cir. 1910) 181 Fed. 87.
83731 Stat. at L. 699. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry.,
(1917) 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326.
8839 Stat. at L. 1069. United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420, 39 Sup. Ct.
143, 63 L. Ed. 337.
8
The Hawes-Cooper Act is an application of the principle of the WebbKenyon Act to prison-made goods, and, inasmuch as it now takes effect, its
constitutionality may be tested soon.
4
Clark Distilling Company v. Western Maryland Ry., (1917) 242
U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326.
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which restricts state control over them. The principle upon which
the removal of this character was upheld at the destination of the
goods should, it is submitted, be equally applicable to removal of
this character at the state of origin.
V
Some miscellaneous questions of constitutionality remain to be
considered. They are: (1) the labor provisions of the Act, (2)
the problem of the delegation of legislative power to the executive,
and (3) the declaration in the final section of the Act concerning
the effect of a decision as to its unconstitutionality.
(1) Labor provisions. The labor provisions of the Recovery
Act which most particularly raise questions of congressional power
are to be found in section seven (a).
"Every code of fair competition, agreement, and license approved, prescribed, or issued under this title shall contain the following conditions: (1) that employees shall have the right to
organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation
of such representatives or in self-organization or in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection; (2) that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join
any company union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or
assisting a labor organization of his own choosing; and (3) that
employers shall comply with the maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other conditions of employment, approved
or prescribed by the president."
The case that comes to mind immediately in this connection is
that of Adair v. United States,4 ' wherein an act of congress was
declared invalid because it provided for penalties for the discharge
by a common carrier of its employees on the ground that they were
members of labor unions. Wilson v. New, 42 sustaining the Adamson Act, regulating the hours of labor and wages of labor on interstate railroads, seemed not to make any inroads upon the Adair
Case, but the recent decision in Texas & New Orleans Railroad v.
Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks43 seems to have
restricted the principle of the Adair Case considerably. In the
Texas & New Orleans Case, a congressional statute was involved
41(1908) 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436.
42(1917) 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 71 L. Ed. 755.
43(1930) 281 U. S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct. 427, 74 L. Ed. 1034.
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which provided that representatives of employees to speak for
them in negotiations before the Board of Mediation, and with the
employers, should be chosen "without interference, influence, or
coercion exercised by either party over the self-organization or
designation of representatives by the other." The Brotherhood was
awarded an injunction ordering the company to desist from interfering with the free choice of representatives by the employees.
This order was sustained, and the statute upheld on appeal to the
Supreme Court. It appeared that the company discriminated
against employees who led the opposition to the company union.
In the course of the opinion of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Hughes said:
"We entertain no doubt of the constitutional authority of congress to enact the prohibition. The power to regulate commerce
is the power to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for its 'protection and advancement.' .
And again:
"Exercising this authority, congress may facilitate the amicable settlement of disputes which threaten the services of the
necessary agencies of interstate transportation. . . The legality
of collective action on the part of employees in order to safeguard
their proper interests is not to be dispufed ..
. Congress was not
required to ignore this right of the employees but could safeguard
it and seek to make their appropriate collective action an instrument of peace rather than of strife. Such collective action would
be a mockery if representation were made futile by interferences
with freedom of choice. Thus the prohibition by congress of interference with the selection of representatives for the purpose of
negotiation and conference between employers and employees, instead of being an invasion of the constitutional right of either, was
based on the recognition of the rights of both. . . . The Railway
Labor Act of 1926 does not interfere with the normal exercise of
the right of the carrier to select its employees or to discharge them.
The statute is not aimed at this right of the employers but at the
interference with the right of employees to have representatives
of their own choosing. As the carriers subject to the Act have no
constitutional right to interfere with the freedom of the employees
in making their selection, they cannot complain of the statute on
constitutional grounds."
An equitable, instead of a criminal, action was involved in the
Texas & New Orleans Case, while in the Adair Case a criminal
prosecution was attempted. The statute in the Texas & New
Orleans Case did not forbid discharge on any particular ground,
nor did it forbid discrimination on the ground of membership in
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a labor union. The Recovery Act goes a step further and combines the provisions of the Railway Labor Act with those of the
statute invalidated in the Adir Case. It may be of some significance that section seven (a) of the Recovery Act contains no provision for a criminal penalty, such as was included in the statute
involved in the Adair Case.
The labor provisions of section seven (a) can be sustained in
toto only by distinguishing the conditions existing in commerce
and labor in 1908 and in 1933. It may be said with some show of
adherence to the facts that membership in a labor union was not
particularly connected with interstate commerce in 1908, while it
is probably true that in 1933 a close and substantial connection
between the two can be made out. If this is true, it is possible to
uphold the provisions of section seven (a) without doing violence
to Adair v. United States, although the practical effect of such a
decision would be to render the Adair Case of very limited application. Wilson v. New certainly marked a point of departure in
the recognition by both congress and the Supreme Court of the
close relationship existing between labor unions and their methods
and interstate commerce. Perhaps the phrase "relations between
employer and employee" would more accurately describe the situation sought to be regulated by the Adamson, Railway Labor, and
Recovery acts, than the phrase "labor unions."
(2) Delegation of legislative power. With respect to the constitutional question presented by the delegation of legislative powers to the president, the National Industrial Recovery Act has
been drafted with special care to abide by the requirements of past
decisions on this subject. Guides are furnished, and events specified, and conditions described, upon which executive action is to
be predicated.
Delegation of legislative power is perfectly permissible, provided that sufficient restrictions are placed by the congress upon
the exercise of the power so that the Supreme Court can say that
the "policy" has been indicated by congress, and the "details" to
be filled in left to the president. It must be remembered that it is
the president that these powers are given to, not some inferior
officer, and despite the fact that the Act permits delegation by him
in turn to others, these others are officers in high position.
Great discretion may be vested in the president by congress,
and in most instances care has been taken to indicate just when
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the president is to act, and what the scope of his action is to be
when he acts. But in section four (b) the Act authorizes the
president, in the licensing section, to issue licenses "pursuant to
such regulations as the president shall prescribe." At first glance
this seems a very broad grant of power, but, as noted earlier, the
grants of power in the licensing provision are circumscribed by one
set of purposes, namely, those connected with the effectuation of
the policies of the provisions authorizing codes of fair competition
and agreements. It is an implied restriction, therefore, that the
regulations to be issued by the president are to be for the purpose
of effectuating the enforcement of the codes and agreements
authorized by the Act.
It should also be noticed that the president does not prescribe
the penalties to be visited upon persons violating his rules and regulations, but that these are fixed by statute. 44 The Recovery Act
should, therefore, not have any serious difficulty before the Supreme Court on the score of the delegation of legislative power.
Previous acts of congress going as far or further have been upheld.

45

(3) Declaration as to the Effect of Unconstitutionality. The
Recovery Act, in the separability clause in the final section of the
Act, provides:
"If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act,
and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby."
Separability clauses have been common in legislation for many
years, but the form of this clause is somewhat different from those
generally in use hitherto. The typical separability clause usually
provides that if any portion of the statute is held to be invalid,
that portion shall be deemed separable from the remainder of the
act, and the invalidity of the one provision is not to affect the
validity of the other provisions. To this declaration the separability clause of the Recovery Act adds a new feature, namely, that
44
Penalties must usually be fixed by statute, and statutes giving administrators the power to fix them are usually held to be invalid. But
there are instances in the national administration, as in foreign commerce
and immigration, when it is permissible for congress to delegate even this
power. See Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima v. Elting (1932) 289 U. S.
320, 53 Sup. Ct. 167, 77 L. Ed. 341.
45
Hampton v. United States, (1928) 276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct. 348, 72
L. Ed. 624, and cases therein cited and discussed.
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if the Act is held invalid in its application to one set of persons or
circumstances it should, despite this, be held unaffected as to other
persons and other circumstances.
Separability clauses are not binding upon the courts." They
are of evidential value in showing that the legislature feels that
the policy of the statute is sufficiently complete to be enforced or
carried out even though one of the provisions be declared unconstitutional. The courts decide for themselves whether the remainder of the statute leaves a workable program, or, as it is
phrased sometimes, leaves a program which the legislature would
have approved had it known that the particular section would have
been invalidated.
This partial unconstitutionality of the text of the statute is to
be distinguished from the unconstitutionality of a statute as applied to a situation or to a person or group of persons. A statute
may be valid as to one person and as to one situation and invalid
as to another person and another situation.17 This rule of the
effect of unconstitutionality is applied more often in the due process and commerce fields than in any other branches of our national
constitutional law. The rule is a judicial rule, formulated by the
courts themselves. The whole law of the effect of decisions on
unconstitutionality is judge-made law. It is not dependent upon
statute, exists independently of statute, and depends only upon
broad grounds of constitutional theory for its support.
This is the field of law, due process and commerce, where this
rule of separability as to purpose and object is enforced by the
courts, and the separability clause of the Recovery Act only declares that the rule shall apply to this Act. If the Supreme Court
wished to apply a different rule, such, for example, as the rule that
the whole of the statute is invalid as applied to all persons and all
things and situations contemplated by the text, it could do so. As
in the textual separability, the legislative expression is of weight,
but only of evidentiary weight and value, not of conclusive force
on the Court. It is unlikely that the courts will permit legislative
46Stockyards Nat'l Bk. v. Baumann, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1925) 5 F. (2d)

905. 4 7

Compare, Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Anderson, (1916) 233 U. S.
325, 34 Sup. Ct. 599, 56 L. Ed. 983, and St. L. I. Mt. & So. Ry. v. Wynne,
(1912) 224 U. S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct. 493, 56 L. Ed. 799, Gast Realty & Inv.
Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 55, 56 Sup. Ct. 254, 60 L.
Ed. 523, and Withnell v. Ruecking Constr. Co., (1919) 249 U. S. 63, 39
Sup. Ct. 200, 63 L. Ed. 479.
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declarations on the rules applicable to this branch of constitutional
law to be any more binding than they are in this branch of the
law generally. A wise draftsman will always put these provisions
in a statute, but they do no more than to aid the court if it wishes,
on independent grounds, to achieve the result contemplated by
the words of the separability clause itself.
The importance of this type of separability rule is illustrated
by supposing that the Act is held invalid as to barber shops in
New York, and valid as to the steel industry. Steel is necessary
to recovery; hair cuts are convenient but not necessary in a recovery program.
VI
In conclusion it must be said that the draftsmen of the National Recovery Act proceeded with great care and considerable
courage to chart their way through the body of case law which
embroiders the text of the constitution of the United States. Analytically considered, they have assumed that the logic of past
decisions would be extended to render the statute valid. Historically considered, they have assumed that the trends in constitutional law would proceed just one step further, so as to make it
possible to uphold the statute. Considered from the standpoint of
political policy, they have assumed that the Supreme Court would
view the Act in the light of present conditions, rather than in the
light of strict stare decisis as that doctrine is applied in private
law.
It is perfectly possible to hold the Recovery Act valid without
overruling any decision. However, the Supreme Court has been
known to overrule past decisions when it found it necessary to do
so.4 8

On all fronts the Recovery Act pushes logical analysis one

step further, and historical trends another step further, but in no
sense does it call for anything revolutionary in constitutional law to
sustain it.
Mention should be made of the confusion which is present in
current discussion of the constitutionality of the Recovery Act,
arising as it does out of an assumption that because a code may
contain something which is unconstitutional the Recovery Act itself is invalid. The Act is not to be judged by the codes or agree48Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, (1932)
L. Ed. 1010.

286 U. S. 123, 52 Sup. Ct. 546, 76
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ments formulated under it. Codes may be formulated which are
not authorized by the statute. The statute will not be unconstitutional merely because those administering it fail to follow it. The
code provisions may in some instances be illegal, or they may be
unconstitutional, but the Recovery Act is to be judged on its own
merits, on what it authorizes to be done, and not upon what is
done in its name. Many questions of statutory interpretation and
administrative law doubtless will come before the courts because
of the Act, but these are to be distinguished from questions of the
constitutionality of the Act itself. Due process imposes a standard of reasonableness not only upon the Act itself, but also upon
the administrative actions taken in pursuance of it.49 Actions
taken must be reasonable, and if the Act does not fix any standard
the due process clause does so, and the courts will apply that
standard. But if the Act fixes a standard which is reasonable, and
the administrators fix an unreasonable standard, it is the administrative action which is invalid, not the statute.
Nothing stated herein is intended to refer to any other portion
of the National Industrial Recovery Act than that included in
Title I, unless expressly stated to the contrary. This author believes that the Supreme Court should and will hold the Act constitutional. This is not to say that everything done under the Act
is constitutional. With this reservation its judicial validation calls
for no new constitutional theory.
49
Price-fixing is not expressly provided for in the Act under Title I.
If the power to fix prices is there, it must be implied from some other provision, such as the provision on licensing. On due process applying to administrative action, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (1886) 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup.
Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 229; People ex rel. Lieberman v. Van de Carr, (1905)
199 U. S. 552, 26 Sup. Ct. 144, 50 L. Ed. 305.

